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RECENT CASES

RELEASES-SCOPE OF GENERAL RELEASES AND
JOINDER OF ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTRELEASOR'S SUBSEQUENT CLAIM
FOR CONTRIBUTION NOT BARRED
Restifo v. McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967).
In Restifo v. McDonald1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held that a general release of all claims arising from an accident does not include a release of the right to seek contribution
when that right is not specifically incorporated into the language
of the instrument. In reaching this result the court expressly
Co., 2 Killian v. Catanese3
overruled Polley v. Atlantic Refining
4
and a long line of cases based thereon.
Appellant McDonald operated an automobile which collided
with one operated by Mrs. Restifo, in which her husband and
children were passengers. For the consideration of $450 McDonald
executed an instrument releasing Mr. and Mrs. Restifo
from all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits at law or in equity, of whatsoever kind or
nature . . . and particularly on account of all injuries both
to person and property resulting ...

from an accident

which occurred on or about the 20th day of August, 1963.
Subsequently, on behalf of themselves and their minor children,
the Restifos sued McDonald's estate in trespass for property damage
and personal injuries. When McDonald's personal representative
sought to join co-plaintiff Mrs. Restifo as an additional defendant
with respect to the claim of her minor children, Mrs. Restifo
1. 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967).
2. 417 Pa. 549, 207 A.2d 900 (1965) (only Bell, C.J., Roberts and
Musmanno, JJ., joined in the majority opinion; Eagen and O'Brien, JJ.,
concurred in the result; Cohen and Jones, JJ., dissented).
3. 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379 (1954) (holding that when A obtains a
general release from B, B cannot join A as an additional defendant in a
subsequent suit, initiated against'B by C, but arising out of the same
cause of action).
4. See, e.g., Berman v. Plotkin, 172 F. Supp. 214 (ED. Pa. 1959);
Rimpa v. Bell, 413 Pa. 274;, 196 A.2d 738 (1964); Moyer Iv. Independent
Oil Co., 401 Pa. 335, 164.A.2d 552 (1960); Mayer v. Knopf, 396 Pa.. 312,
152 A.2d 482 (1959). But see Kent v. FPair, 392 Pa: 272, 140 A.2d '445 (1958);
Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956).
5. 426 Pa. at 8, 230 A.2d at 200.. That the release in the instant case
is identical to those in the cases cited note 4 supra.was amply demonstrated. See Brief for Appellee at 3-7, Restifo v. McDonald, :426 Pa. 5,
230 A.2d 199 (1967).
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pleaded the written release as a defense. On appeal, the decision
of the trial court sustaining appellee Restifo's motion for judgment
on the pleadings was reversed. The supreme court held that the
release merely prohibited recovery on an action which originated
with the decedent-releasor. Therefore, the release did not bar
joinder of Mrs. Restifo0 as an additional defendant. 7
The Restifo setting raises several difficult and recurring questions in those jurisdictions which recognize the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors.8 The facts of the instant case were
not atypical. In a collision between two vehicles, both the driver
of one car (A) and his passenger (B) are injured while only the
vehicle of the second driver (C) is damaged. After negotiating
with A's insurer and in consideration of a nominal amount of
money, C signs a general release. Most likely, C contemplates only
a release of claims for any injuries and property damage to himself.
Only rarely would C be cognizant that in the event of B's suit
against him, a valuable claim for contribution exists against A.
In this context 9 courts are required to decide the effect and
6. While Pennsylvania's doctrine of intrafamily immunity prevents
plaintiff from obtaining a judgment against Mrs. Restifo, she nonetheless
remains liable to appellant for contribution if she is found to be a joint
tortfeasor. See Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955); Fisher v.
Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945). See generally Note, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1967).
7. Interestingly, the court never reached the question whether Mrs.
Restifo's alleged sole liability might be a basis for her joinder as an additional defendant, in addition to the ground of contribution. The issue was
presented to the court. See Brief for Appellant at 8, where it is argued that
rule 2252 (d) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure expressly grants
this right of joinder. Because the majority rested its decision on the contribution theory, it evidently chose not to discuss this collateral problem.
Yet neither the syllabus writer of the Atlantic Reporter nor the Pennsylvania reporter was deterred from deciding the issue for the court. They
assert that the co-plaintiff could also be joined on a theory of sole liability.
426 Pa. at 6 (headnote no. 1), 230 A.2d at 199 (headnote no. 4).
8. Pennsylvania has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, PA. STAT. ANN'. tit. 12, § 2082 (Supp. 1966). Approximately half
of the states have enacted legislation pertaining to contribution among
joint tortfeasors. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM CONnIEUTiON AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1955 Rev. Act), 9 Um_. LAWS ANN. 125-26
(Supp. 1967).
9. Courts are confronted with problems in construing general releases
in various contexts. Often courts restrict the scope of such instruments on
the basis of the circumstances surrounding its execution. See, e.g., United
States v. Ramstad Constr. Co., 194 F. Supp. 379 (D. Alas. 1961) (subcontractor's release); Graham v. Taller & Cooper, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.
N.Y. 1950) (recital on check for vacation pay); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d
292, 157 N.E.2d 505 (1959); Simon v. Simon, 274 App. Div. 447, 84 N.Y.S.2d
307 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (divorce settlement); Meil v. Syracuse Constructors,
Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 39, 247 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (automobile accident).
Two propositions common to these decisions are that the person
executing a general release does not relinquish claims of which he has no
knowledge and that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to interpret the
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scope of these general releases. When the language of the instrument does not specifically refer to the right of contribution, yet
seems sufficiently broad to encompass that right, differences in
result often turn on whether a court is willing to admit extrinsic
evidence to clarify the intention of the parties. 10 Without discussing the merits of admitting parol evidence, however, the Restifo
court aligned itself with those courts which permit joinder of the
releasee as an additional defendant. 1' Instead of requiring the
trier of fact to consider parol evidence on remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed a so-called "strict" construction on
such releases in order to achieve what the court discerned to be
the intention of the parties to the release.
The Restifo court rejected as unsound the Killian-Polley rationale of construing general, all-inclusive releases as encompassing the right to seek contribution because the majority found it
incompatible with what they now ascertain to be the proper rules
governing the construction of releases. 12 That a release governs
only those matters within the contemplation of the parties is an
irrefutable proposition. 13 With this rule as a foundation, the court
proceeded to its second major premise: that general words in a
release should not be construed to bar enforcement of a claim
which has not accrued at the date of the release. 14 At this point
the analysis in Restifo seemed to falter. The ultimate decision became a rationalization of the court's attitude toward releases rather
intention of the parties at the time the release was executed. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960) (release of one joint tortfeasor discharging liability of others); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 196 (1949) (contribution
between joint tortfeasors as affected by settlement with one or both by
person injured or damaged).
10. See Havighurst, Principles of Construction and the ParolEvidence
Rule As Applied to Releases, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 599, 612-13 (1965).
11. Accord, Edester v. Heady, 364 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963);
Leitner v. Hawkins, 311 Ky. 300, 223 S.W.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1949); Pub.
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 119 A.2d 172
(1955). Contra,Brown v. Eakin, 50 Del. 574, 137 A.2d 385 (Super. Ct. 1957);
Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966); McNair v. Goodwin, 262
N.C. 1, 136 S.E.2d 218 (1964). But cf. McCallister v. Jones, 208 Ore. 365,
300 P.2d 973 (1956).
12. Chief Justice Bell would rest his affirmance of the Killian-Polley
decisions on the doctrine of stare decisis. 426 Pa. at 12-18, 230 A.2d at
202-05 (dissenting opinion). He fears the requirement of too much specificity for a release to encompass all possible situations. By implication, he
argues that it is no longer possible to prepare a completely effective
general release.
13. See Wenger v. Ziegler, 424 Pa. 268, 226 A.2d 653 (1967); Brill's
Estate, 337 Pa. 525, 12 A.2d 50 (1940); Flaccus v. Wood, 260 Pa. 161, 103 A.
549 (1918); General Mills, Inc. v. Snavely, 203 Pa. Super. 162, 199 A.2d 540

(1964). See generally 45 Am. Jun. Release § 28 (1943); 76 C.J.S. Release
§ 51 (1952).
14. See Henry Shenk Co. v. Erie, 352 Pa. 481, 43 A.2d 99 (1945);
Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Klein, 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893
(1956).
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than a recognition and resolution of the real question involved.
The court conveniently extended the strict construction mandate
of Cady v. Mitchel'15 to the Restifo facts. As in Cady, because of
the possibility of "overreaching" 16 and because the Restifo court
felt that the right of contribution was not bargained for, it held
that the release was not available as a defense to joinder of the releasee as an additional defendant.
Assuming arguendo that the court in Restifo was correct in
its premise that only those claims which have accrued as of the
date of the release are barred, the next proper inquiry is whether
the right of contribution is inchoate or only a potential right which
could not have accrued as of that date." That is, is the right of
contribution accruing or maturing, so as to be releasable and therefore includable within the fair meaning of the phrases of the release?
The supreme court failed, however, to appreciate the crucial
distinction between a joint tortfeasor's right to recover contribution from another tortfeasor with whom he has been adjudicated
jointly liable and his inchoate right to contribution before payment
or discharge of the common liability. The latter nuance recognizes
that the right of contribution is also extant before a judicial decision on the joint liability question, a logical distinction which has
been adopted by courts of other jurisdictions."' Since the Restifo
court did not even allude to this distinction, it either chose to ignore
it or was perhaps unaware of this theory, for it unequivocally
stated: "The releasing party, unless he is a lawyer, is unlikely to
be cognizant of this potential right, a right which in any event does
15. 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966); see Note, 28 U. PrrT. L. REv.
109 (1966) (approving the Cady result). See generally Amnot., 71 A.L.R.2d

82 (1960)

(avoidance of release of personal injury claim on ground of

fraud or mistake as to extent or nature of injuries).
16. "Overreaching" in this context implies a relatively quick settlement in a factual situation which would call for a more circumspect
agreement. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297
(1950).
17. See Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966). See generally
42 NorRE DAmE LAWYER 439 (1967) (a lucid Note discussing Norton in
light of the Killian-Polley approach and the minority view represented by
Leitner v. Hawkins, 311 Ky. 300, 223 S.W.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1949) ).
18. See Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Fond Du Lac, 297 F.2d
583, 585 (7th Cir. 1961) (applying Wisconsin law); D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v.
Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904, 906-09 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying Rhode Island law);
La Ferry v. Ajax Truck Rentals, 161 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Tenn. 1958); Consolidated Couch Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16, 17 (1932); Sattleberger v. Talep, 14 N.J. 353, 364, 102 A.2d 577, 583 (1954); Glazer v. Wheeler,
130 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 137 Tex.
361, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1949); Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 35 N.W.2d 911
(1949); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302,
304, 251 N.W. 491, 492 (1933); cf. Havighurst, supra note 10, at 611; 42
NoTRE DAME LAWYER 439, 441n.16 (1967). See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2d

Contribution § 47 (1965).
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not accrue until after an action has been instituted against the releasor by a third party."'9 As authority for that proposition the
court referred to cases cited earlier in its opinion,2 none of which
approaches even the weight of dictum on the question whether an
incidental or inchoate right to compel contribution (that is, one
having an independent existence in contemplation of law) comes
into existence as a property right of the tortfeasor at the moment
common or joint liability attaches. To dismiss without mention
the concept of an inchoate right to contribution and to cite as
authority cases which do not even involve contribution would suggest that the Restifo court's analysis was less than penetrating.
Since the court gave great weight to Cady v. Mitchell,21 that
case should also be examined. In Cady the plaintiff gave defendant
a general release for all claims arising out of an automobile accident including "all unknown, unforeseen, unanticipated and unsuspected injuries." 22 The release was signed nine days after the
accident and the consideration was the lowest estimate received
by the plaintiff for automobile repairs. Although neither party
suspected it at the time of the release, Mrs. Cady subsequently
developed symptoms indicating that she had sustained serious injuries. The superior court, unanimously affirming the jury's invalidation of the release, rested their decision on the ground that
the release could not be construed to cover these injuries since
neither party had contemplated personal injuries. 23 The Restifo
court reasoned by analogy to Cady that in the case at bar there
was no meeting of the minds concerning the right of contribution.
The release could not, therefore, be construed as barring contribution.
Close scrutiny suggests that the strong reliance which the
Restifo court placed on the strict construction rule of Cady was
19. 426 Pa. at 10, 230 A.2d at 201 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 9, 230 A.2d at 201. The majority's cross reference cites the
following cases, none of which involves contribution among tortfeasors:
Wenger v. Ziegler, 424 Pa. 268, 226 Pa. 653 (1967) (release executed by
buyer of diseased cow to seller discharging all claims for tortious acts);
Henry Shenk Co. v. Erie, 352 Pa. 481, 43 A.2d 99 (1945) (abutting property
owner's waiver of damages incident to widening of street); Brill's Estate,
337 Pa. 525, 12 A.2d 50 (1940) (release given in settlement of all claims and
accounts concerning a support and maintenance bond); Flaccus v. Wood, 260
Pa. 161, 103 A. 549 (1917) (receipt reciting final settlement for personal
services rendered); Shepley v. Lylte, 6 Watts 500 (Pa. 1837) (release attached to a power of attorney to receive a legacy); General Mills, Inc. v.
Snavely, 203 Pa. Super. 162, 199 A.2d 540 (1964) (release in settlement of
account of feed shipments); Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Klein, 181
Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956) (general release executed by producers
under general warranty deed to vendors prior to knowledge of pre-existing
tax liens on property); Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Pa.
Super. 293, 189 A. 687 (1937) (release in double-indemnity suicide case).
21. 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966).
22. Id. at 18, 220 A.2d at 374.
23. Id. at 21, 220 A.2d at 375.
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not warranted, for the cases are distinguishable factually. Moreover, as will be noted, the precise question decided in Cady is
different from the issue in Restifo; the reasons supporting the
Cady result are inapposite to the decision in Restifo; and the difference in the procedural posture of the two cases is crucial.
In Cady the court upheld the jury's action in voiding the release since at the time the instrument was executed neither party
suspected latent injuries to Mrs. Cady. In Restifo the court reasoned that since the releasing party was unlikely to be aware of
his potential right of contribution, releasor McDonald's position
was analogous to Mrs. Cady's ignorance of her latent injury; thus,
the release was an ineffective defense to the right of contribution asserted. The Restifo court overlooked, however, the crucial
factual distinction that the unsuspected injury in Cady is different
from the inchoate right of contribution in Restifo. Mrs. Cady
could not have been apprised of her injury if she had contacted a
competent physician immediately prior to the release because she
had no pain or other symptoms of the injury until four months
after the accident.2 4 In Restifo, however, Mr. McDonald could
easily have learned of his right to seek contribution by consulting
any lawyer. Although Mrs. Cady could not have discovered her
injury through normal channels of inquiry, Mr. McDonald would
have been informed of the possible release of his right had he sought
advice from the usual source.
Furthermore, the reasons assigned for the decision in Cady
are inapplicable to the issue in Restifo. The Cady court considered the effectiveness of specific language in a general release,
which stated that it was a release "of any damage, loss, or injury
which heretofore has been or which hereafter may be sustained by
us in consequence of an accident. . .

."

and that "this release ex-

tends to and applies to and also covers and includes all unknown
and unforeseen, unanticipated and unsuspected injuries ... ,
The court decided whether this language effectively released any
claim Mrs. Cady might have had against Miss Mitchell for latent
injuries, unknown when the release was executed, but causally
connected to the accident. The question considered by the Restifo
court is different: whether the all-inclusive terms of a general release may be construed to bar the releasor's right to seek contribution from his releasee. Since Cady was a case of first impression,
the court considered similar decisions in other jurisdictions and
adopted the view of most courts that a release may be set aside if
at the time of execution the parties were bargaining under a mutual
mistake of fact as to the extent of the injuries suffered by the releasor.2 6 The Cady court accepted the majority reasoning that if
24.

Record at 20a-21a, 219a, Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220

A.2d 373 (1966).
25. 208 Pa. Super. at 18, 220 A.2d at 374.
26. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960).
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there has been some "overreaching" by a defendant-releasee or
other circumstances from which a court may conclude that there
was no intention that the settlement include payment for unknown
injuries, then a release explicitly covering unknown injuries may
be ignored. These reasons do not logically coincide with the reasons
which would be adequate for deciding the precise issue in Restifo,
such as some evidentiary showing that the parties did or did not
contemplate and bargain for release of the right of contribution.
Finally, the different procedural manner in which the issues
were presented to the Cady and Restifo courts is significant. In
Cady the effect of the release was passed on by the jury. After a
verdict invalidating the release, Miss Mitchell appealed to the superior court. In Restifo, however, the posture in which the supreme court heard the issue was an appeal by the original defendant-releasor from the decision of the lower court sustaining additional defendant-releasee's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The record 2T and lower court opinion in Cady show that the jury
was permitted to examine extrinsic evidence attendant to the execution of the release to determine whether the release should be
avoided because of a mutual mistake of fact. The material factors
which the Cady jury examined to ascertain the intent of the parties
were the general circumstances of the execution of the release (to
determine whether the parties were ignorant of the existence of
the unexpected injury); the date the release was signed in relation
to the date of the accident; whether the consideration for the release bore any relation to the property damage to the car; and
whether there was any serious dispute as to defendant-releasee's
liability. Despite the importance attached to the jury's findings
based on the extrinsic evidence in Cady, the Restifo court was apparently unconcerned about the possibility that admission of parol
evidence would more adequately protect the releasee's rights.
Whether a party may have parol evidence adduced to show the
circumstances surrounding the execution of a release contract
should not turn on the procedural stage at which the question is
submitted to the supreme court.
The Restifo opinion seems correct when it states that Cady
mandated strict construction of releases in Pennsylvania. Cady
is authority for construing releases strictly to avoid "overreaching,"
that is, quick settlements. But Cady is also sound authority for a
liberal interpretation of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule
to ascertain the intent of the parties to the release and the scope
of the rights released. 28 The Restifo court nonetheless impliedly
27. Record at 225a-27a, Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d
373 (1966).
28. Cf. Lucas v. Gibson, 341 Pa. 427, 19 A.2d 395 (1941) (parol evidence
admitted to prove lack of consideration for release); Vogel v. Taub, 316
Pa. 41, 173 A. 270 (1934) (parol evidence admitted on questions of fraud and
consideration paid for a release).
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held that it was not necessary to introduce parol evidence to determine whether the releasor's right of contribution existed despite
the release? 9 The court is thus in the anomalous position of affirming one part30 of the Cady doctrine while subverting an equally
significant part.
29. The court found no meeting of the minds in Restifo because it
imputes to the releasor an absence of intent to bargain away his potential
(i.e., inchoate) right to seek contribution from an additional defendant.
In so doing, however, the court only begs the question. Without admitting
extrinsic evidence to ascertain if what the parties in fact contemplated
was only a release of the claims the releasor sought to bring against the
releasee, and by then deciding the question negatively, the court assumes
its conclusion.
30. The court may yet have an opportunity to examine the extrinsic
evidence pertinent to this case since appellee has filed a petition for reargument. Included therein is an affidavit of appellee's insurance carrier
relative to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release. Also
of note is the fact that the release was a typewritten instrument and not a
printed form. Petition for Reargument at 3-4. Unfortunately for appellee
and for lawyers who must draft future releases, it is unlikely that the
court will grant reargument on the crucial extrinsic evidence question.
Appellee has sought a rehearing on the question whether a court can overrule a previous decision in a case (e.g., Polley v. Atlantic Refining Co., 417
Pa. 549, 207 A.2d 900 (1965); Rimpa v. Bell, 413 Pa. 274, 196 A.2d 738 (1964);
Killian v. Catanese, 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379 (1954)) when a party has
specifically changed his position to his detriment in reliance on that decision. Appellee argues that to sanction the Restifo result when his client
specifically relied on Polley, Rimpa and Killian by incorporating the exact
wording of Rimpa v. Bell into his release is to impair the obligation of
contracts under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Although counsel for appellee
fails to point this out to the court in his petition, the Pennsylvania law on
this question is unsettled in light of Farber v. Perkiomen Mut. Ins. Co., 370
Pa. 480, 486, 88 A.2d 776, 779 (1952), in which it was held that when the
legal meaning of a fire insurance policy had been determined and established by prior decisions of the court, to depart therefrom would be an
impairment of the obligation of written contracts. See generally 7 P.L.E.
Constitutional Law § 132 (1958).
While the Pennsylvania decisions in
point appear to be inconsistent, it is submitted that the Farber case is a
maverick decision. The heavy preponderance of authority is to the effect
that there are no vested rights in the decisions of a court. Furthermore, a
departure from the former decision of a state court does not constitute the
"passing of a law," even though effectively such a change impairs the
validity of a contract made in reliance on prior decisions. That is, the
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 prohibition that no state "shall pass any . . . law"
impairing the obligation of contract is directed only against impairment by
legislation and not by judicial decisions. See generally 16 AM. JUE. 2d
ConstitutionalLaw § 452 (1964).
It must be noted, however, that releasor Mr. McDonald died prior to
the suit of causes unrelated to the accident. Releasee Mrs. Restifo would,
therefore, be barred from testifying as to the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the release. Even though McDonald's administratrix represents him on the record as the person to whom his rights have passed, because of her adverse interest Mrs. Restifo would be disqualified from
testifying as to anything occurring before McDonald's death. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 322 (1958). See generally 2 HENRY, PENNSYLVANiA EVIDENcE §§
767-77 (1953). Mrs. Restifo's evidence as to events and circumstances surrounding the execution of the release and the intention of the parties
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Apart from the extension of the Cady principle of strict construction of releases to a contribution setting, the Restifo opinion
has little authorative foundation for its result. Perhaps the court
recognized this weakness, for Justice Roberts attempted to strengthen the rationale by hypothesizing a situation in which fraud and
deception are likely to occur:
P, a close friend of D-2 and a passenger in his car, is injured through the joint negligence of D-2 and D-1. In the
the same automobile accident D-l's car is slightly damaged.
If P waits until D-2, or his insurance company, buys a release from D-1 before instituting a lawsuit, he may be able
to obtain full recovery from D-1 and keep D-2's friendship.
In some instances D-2 might even purchase P's patience;
at least in many cases, such as the instant one, P and D-2
are apt to have a common interest so that these tactics will
work to their mutual benefit.3 1
Although there is merit to this argument on its face, close
scrutiny discloses its weakness. The Restifo court held that to be
effective the release contract itself must include language to show
that the right to seek contribution was bargained for and within
the parties' contemplation.12 It is not unlikely, therefore, that all
the court has done is to make business for the printer. Nothing
in Restifo dictates a result different from that required by the
Killian-Polley line of cases, assuming that all existing stocks of
general releases are destroyed and new releases prepared containing the sentence: "It is understood and agreed that the right to
contribution has been specifically bargained for and released herein." Would inclusion of this language deter the ordinary releasor,
unsophisticated in the law, from signing the release? It is also
doubtful that it would 33prevent the collusive situation which disturbed Justice Roberts.

The argument that inclusion in the instrument of a phrase releasing all future rights of contribution would put the layman on
notice to ask his attorney about the right has some merit. But
putting the prospective releasor (D-1) in the hypothetical above
on notice of his right of contribution from his prospective releasee
(D-2) cannot, however, destroy any collusion or common interest
between D-2 and the injured party-prospective plaintiff P. P may
still refrain from suing D-1 until his friend D-2 has obtained a genwould be inadmissible unless these relevant matters occurred in the presence of a disinterested third person who testified about them at trial.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 325 (1958). Since only the extrinsic evidence of
parties who had no adverse interest would be permitted in Restifo, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision ignoring the parol evidence aspects
and allowing the joinder of additional defendant Mrs. Restifo may have
unwittingly been the best practical solution under these peculiar facts.
31. Restifo v. McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 11, 230 A.2d 199, 201-02 (1967).
32. Id.
33. This argument goes also to the objection raised by Chief Justice
Bell in his dissent. See note 12 supra.
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eral release which incorporates the specific release of the right of
contribution. The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that
Restifo no more forecloses this undesired result than did the
Killian-Polley cases.
An alternative approach to this problem, which would more
adequately protect against the possibility of fraud, is to apply the
ordinary contract rules of construction. Because a release is a
type of contract, '34 it is subject to all the rules controlling interpreta-

tion of contracts generally, including the parol evidence rule and
its exceptions. In the absence of fraud, duress or mutual mistake,
when the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated
writing, the parol evidence rule requires the exclusion of extrinsic
evidence of preceding or accompanying negotiations which would
vary or contradict the terms of the written instrument. 5 When
courts will
the language of the contract is ambiguous, however,
36
admit extrinsic evidence to permit interpretation.
Whether a court will find an ambiguity in the general release
(with or without the phrase including the right of contribution)
in order to admit extrinsic evidence is a question not susceptible
of a predictable answer. The results seem to be attributable only
to the court's initial response to a general release and to differing
judicial attitudes toward the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
clarify the intention of the parties. 7 The modern and more enlightened trend favors the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.38 It
is suggested that this approach yields the most equitable solution
to the problems raised by Restifo, regardless of whether the instrument includes a phrase specifying release of the right of contribution.
Prior to Restifo most courts considering whether a general release of all claims arising from an accident included a claim for
contribution, when such claim was not specified in the language
of the release, had been unwilling to admit extrinsic evidence to
show that the right of contribution was not within the contempla34. Little Rock Packing Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 262
F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1959); Westfall v. Motors Ins. Corp., 140 Mont. 564, 374
P.2d 96 (1962).
35. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961).
36. Id. § 627.
37. Havighurst, Principles of Construction and the ParolEvidence Rule
as Applied to Releases, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 599, 612-13; see Note, 42 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 439 (1967). Compare Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 253
(Me. 1966) (holding the claim for contribution was "within the fair meaning
and intent" of the release) with Leitner v. Hawkins, 311 Ky. 300, 304, 223
S.W.2d 988, 990 (Ct. App. 1949) (holding "the release purports no such
meaning or intent").
38. In an expression of the utility of this policy, the legislatures of
four states have enacted statutes which would allow this result. CAL. CIV.

CODE § 1542 (1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58-510 (1947); 1 N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-13-02 (1959); 3 S.D. CODE § 47-0241 (1939). CAL. CIV. CODE § 1542

provides:
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tion of the parties at the time of settlement. 9 The majority rationale was founded on the logic of Killian v. Catanese,40 the leading
case. By overruling Killian without admitting extrinsic evidence
to ascertain the intention of the releasing parties, the Restifo
court has not improved the judicial approach to this problem. The
court apparently reacted to a given set of facts and the wording
of the release, then rationalized its predetermined
result by reject41
ing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
The Restifo decision is replete with practical problems. Necessarily, the court was required to decide favorably to several of a
group of mutually exclusive and countervailing policy factors.
The decision favors the liability insurer of the original defendant42
releasor over the insurer of the additional defendant-releasee.
The court assigns priority to the policy of discouragement of
fraud;43 conversely, it minimizes predictability and certainty in
the law, creating practical problems for attorneys attempting to
advise their clients in bargaining for and drafting releases. The
court also disregards the well established policy of encouraging
settlements, and gives precedence to the recently enunciated policy
of strict construction of releases 44 over a rule which would admit
A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor

does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of
executing the release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor.
See Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963)
(a searching analysis of this statute's application to the general release and

the protection of the releasee in the absence of a statute). See also Heath v.
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 89 Idaho 490, 406 P.2d 341 (1965); Sloan v.
Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203 N.E.2d 237 (1964).
39. See cases cited note 11 supra.
40. 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379 (1954). See Note, 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 515,
517-18 (1954), where a critical analysis of Killian raises the question
whether the party attempting to be released has an affirmative duty to
explain to the releasor the full effect of the contract. It should be recognized, however, that no court has been persuaded to apply this duty concept in this contractual setting.
41. It is interesting to speculate why the Restifo court chose the latter
avenue of approach since a subtle, underlying reason, although one seldom
verbalized by courts, for their refusal to allow extrinsic evidence to construe
a release is a judicial desire to protect the large number of general releases
outstanding. While effectively emasculating the mass of general releases
in Pennsylvania as to the contribution question, the court circumvents the
very line of attack which other courts prefer to use to achieve this result,
that is, admission of extrinsic evidence. See 42 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 439,
443-44n.26 (1967).
42. 426 Pa. at lln.8, 230 A.2d at 202n.8. The argument is that it is
inequitable to require the insurer of the releasing party to defend a suit
by an injured third party without the right of subrogation against his
insured, the joint tortfeasor, because his insured has released this right in a
settlement in which he had no voice. See Note, 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 515, 518
n.14 (1954).

43. There is substantial doubt, however, whether the result achieves
the desired goal. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
44.

Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966).
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parol evidence to show the parties' intention.
The Restifo court seemingly wants to counteract the use of the
general release by insurance companies to deprive a party of a
right of which he was unaware when he signed the release. If this
is a desirable policy and the courts wish to implement it successfully, the controlling test in construing general releases should be:
what, in fact, did the parties to the contract intend? This approach,
moreover, comports with the modern statutory answer to the problem and the better reasoned decisions in point. 4'5 To apply this
test the courts should look beyond the rigid doctrine of strict construction of releases to the more flexible device of admitting exclearly specifies relinquishtrinsic evidence, even when the release
46
ment of the right of contribution.
In one sense Pennsylvania law has been clarified. No longer
will a general release bar an original defendant's right of contribution and joinder of an additional defendant unless the instrument contains specific language to that effect. It is nevertheless
unfortunate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court bypassed the
opportunity to resolve the numerous problems which remain in the
Restifo setting.
ROGER J. ECKER

45. See authorities cited note 38 supra.
46. An objection may be raised that in admitting extrinsic evidence
to explain the parties' intention as to an explicitly stated phrase that the
right of contribution was bargained for and released, the policy of the parol
evidence rule is being contravened. That is, there is no ambiguity to be
resolved since the contract clearly specifies relinquishment of the right to
contribution. Quare whether this situation is any different from the admission of extrinsic evidence when a release specifies that the releasor
relinquishes "all claims whatsoever" against the releasee.
According to the better reasoned authority, see note 18 supra and
accompanying text, the right of contribution, although neither contemplated
nor understood, is clearly an extant claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Restifo is willing to hold that a release of "all claims" does not
mean a release of all claims; that is, the right of contribution is excepted.
It follows, therefore, that the court should not refuse to hold that a release
"of a claim for contribution" does not relinquish the releasor's inchoate
right to seek contribution against the releasee.

ANIMALS FERAE NATURAE--COMMONWEALTH NOT
PERMITTED TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN TRESPASS
FOR NEGLIGENT KILLING OF FISH BY POLLUTION
Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. 150, 232 A.2d 69

(1967).
Relying on elementary principles of property law, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently decided in a case of first impression that the Commonwealth does not have such a property interest in fish in a state of freedom as to support an action for damages for their negligent destruction. 1 The fish were destroyed in
a creek allegedly polluted by the defendant.
The Commonwealth brought suit in trespass alleging a violation of section 200 of the Fish Law of 19592 and seeking damages
for the value3 of the fish killed and the destruction of the habitat
of the creek. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that: (1) the Commonwealth had an exclusive statutory remedy in section 202 of the Fish Law, which prescribes a fine;
and (2) the Commonwealth did not have such a property interest in
fish in a state of freedom within its waters as to allow it to maintain an action for damages. 4 The superior court affirmed, but a
concurring opinion, although conceding the exclusivity of the statutory remedy, questioned the majority's assertion that the Commonwealth lacked a sufficient proprietary interest in the fish to
support the trespass action, and noted that:
Fish constitute an important natural resource providing
both food and recreation for our citizens. The Pennsylvania Fish Commission operates a number of hatcheries
and regularly stocks the waters of the Commonwealth, including the stream here involved. 5
It is a well established rule that animals ferae naturae are not
the subject of any property interest or ownership unless they are
reduced to possession. 6 This ownership is said to cease when pos1. Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. 150, 232 A.2d 69
(1967).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 200 (Supp. 1967).
3. The damages sought by the Commonwealth were the "commercial
values" of the fish and did not represent the total cost of replacing the
fish or restoring the habitat. Interview with Robert J. Bielo, Executive
Director of the Pennsylvania Fish Commission, in Harrisburg, October 26,
1967. Compare the "commercial values," Record at 9a, Commonwealth v.
Agway, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. 150, 232 A.2d 69 (1967), with the $10 per fish
fine imposed on the angler who exceeds the limit prescribed by section 41
of the Fish Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 41 (Supp. 1967).
4. Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 86 Dauph. 25 (C.P. Pa. 1966).
5. Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. 150, 155, 232 A.2d
69, 71 (1967) (concurring opinion).
6. See, e.g., Stephens & Co. v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488, 256 P. 15 (1927);
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session terminates. 7 The court in Agway relied upon the common
law requirement of possession in deciding for the defendant, since
the Commonwealth admittedly lacked possession.8 It appears that
by so holding, the court mechanically applied the common law rule
without considering the reasons for the rule or circumstances in
which the rule has been modified.
The requirement of possession was established by the courts
to aid in deciding conflicts between individuals who claimed ownership of wild animals which were without previous owners., The
possession requirement, however, like other common law rules,
has been modified and even disregarded in certain situations. For
example, the doctrine of ratione soli holds the owner of land to have
a superior right to wild animals than a trespasser who "started and
captured" the game.10 It has also been held that when immediate
possession of a wild animal has been lost by its escape, the original
owner retains rights of ownership as long as the animal is pursued
or otherwise subject to recapture. 1 ' Similarly, when an animal
left the owner's possession with the intention of returning (animus
revertendi), rights of ownership have been recognized regardless
of the lack of possession. 12 Fish in an untended net from which
they might possibly escape have been considered the property of the
State v. Shaw, 67 Ohio St. 157, 65 N.E. 875 (1902); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai.
Cas. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1805); Mullet v. Bradley, 24 Misc.
695, 53 N.Y.S. 781 (App. T. 1898); Young v. Hichens, 6 Q.B. 606, 115 Eng.
Rep. 228 (1843). See generally R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY ch. II (2d ed.
1955); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW ch. VI (1881); 3 C.J.S. Animals § 4
(1936); 36A C.J.S. Fish § 2 (1961); 38 C.J.S. Game § 2 (1943).
7. Mullet v. Bradley, 24 Misc. 695, 53 N.Y.S. 781 (App. T. 1898).
8. 210 Pa. Super. at 153, 232 A.2d at 70.
9. See Dapson v. Daly, 257 Mass. 195, 153 N.E. 454 (1926); Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. Cas. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1805); Arnold, The Law
of Possession Governing The Acquisition of Animals Ferae Naturae, 55
AM. L. REV. 393 (1921); R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8 (2d ed. 1955).
10. State v. Rapp, 104 Iowa 305, 73 N.W. 829 (1898); Blades v. Higgs,
11 H.L. Cas. 621 (1865). The doctrine of ratione soli is usually traced to the
dictum of Chief Justice Holt in Sutton v. Moody, 1 Lord Raym. 250 (1697),
who claimed to have found the doctrine established in the Yearbooks. It
is suspected, however, that he was merely enunciating a policy in favor of
the land owner. See Right of Property in Game, 29 JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
402 (1865); Property in Game, 34 JUSTICES OF Tm PEACE 386 (1870); The
Right of Property in Game, 26 JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 466 (1862); On the
Property in Game, 3 JusTIcEs OF THE PEACE 109 (1839). See also Arnold,
supra note 9.
11. See Stephens & Co. v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488, 256 P. 15 (1927). In
that case the rights of the original owner were upheld against those of

the defendant, who had purchased a fox pelt from one who had captured

it after the fox had escaped from the plaintiff-original owner. The court
recognized that its decision was contrary to the common law rule, but felt
that the departure was warranted by the changing nature of the relationship
between wild animals and society.

See generally 3 C.J.S. Animals § 6

(1936); R. BROWN, supra note 9, at § 10.
12. Manning v. Mitcherson, 69 Ga. 447, 47 Am. Rep. 764 (1882); Ulery
v. Jones, 81 Ill. 403 (1876); see 3 C.J.S. Animals § 6 (1936).
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owner of the net."3 Thus, where a basis exists to give an individual
an interest in animals ferae naturae through elements other than
possession, his rights may be upheld over the claim of a possessor.
The rationale seems to be that when the industry and often the
assets of an individual are applied to raising, procuring or preserving wild animals, that person has a priority interest over one who
merely captures
the animal, especially if the captor is also a
14
wrongdoer.
In the situation facing the court in Agway, there were elements
present which could have justified a modification of the common
law requirement of possession. The possession requirement was a
judicial tool used to settle disputes between individuals of equal
stature; 15 should it be applied against the Commonwealth acting
in its sovereign capacity? Defendant Agway was a wrongdoermore so than a mere trespasser-for it violated a statute prohibiting pollution and making it a criminal offense. 16 In addition,
wild animals no longer merely exist as they did during the time
of Blackstone when the common law rule requiring possession
developed. 17 Today fish and game exist in Pennsylvania as a result
of the conservation efforts and activities of the Commonwealth. 18
The Agway court could have permitted the Commonwealth's
action on another ground- the state's "ownership" of the fish even
without possession. Pennsylvania cases have long held that riparian owners do not own or have exclusive fishing rights in streams
13. See State v. Shaw, 67 Ohio St. 157, 65 N.E. 875 (1902).
14. See 3 C.J.S. Animals § 6 (1936); R. BROWN, supra note 9, § 10.
15. See authorities cited in note 9 supra.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 202 (Supp. 1967). When the interest of
another is invaded by an act prohibited by statute the violation may be
deemed negligence per se. See Jinks v. Currie, 324 Pa. 532, 188 A. 356
(1936) (violation of vehicle code held negligence per se where the violation was the proximate cause of the accident); Schlein v. Goldberg, 188
Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). It would seem that this proposition
should apply to the pollution situation since the prohibited act results in
the damage complained of by the Commonwealth. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTs §§ 285, 286, 288B (1965).
17. See Stephens & Co. v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488, 256 P. 15 (1927); Note,
38 GEo. L.J. 652 (1950).
18. The Fish Commission and the Game Commission are specifically
charged with the protection, conservation and propagation of animals ferae
naturae. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 671-75, 691-97 (1962). An example of
the effectiveness of these commissions is provided by the size of the deer
herd in Pennsylvania:
By the 1890's deer were rare everywhere in the state. An abrupt
change in the fortunes of Pennsylvania wildlife came about with
the establishment of the State Game Commission in 1896....
The total deer kill in 1907 was only 300 animals. Just 30 years
later, close to 250,000 were legally harvested in Pennsylvania in
one season.
J. DouTT, C. HEPPENSTALL, J. GUILDAY, MAMMALS OF PENNSYLVANIA 240 (Pa.

Game Comm. 1966).
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flowing through or adjacent to their land; 19 the ownership of
streams and the fish therein apparently was deemed to have descended from William Penn to the Commonwealth. The charter
given to William Penn by the King of England included a specific
grant of the rivers and waters and the fish therein." These rights
descended to Penn's heirs and passed to the Commonwealth in its
sovereign capacity through the Divestment Act of 1779.21
The Commonwealth also has one of the most important indicia
22
of ownership-the power to exclude others from possession.
The Commonwealth exercises this power through the Fish and
23
Game Commissions and its statutory regulation of fish and game.
Thus hunting and fishing have been regarded as mere privileges
and fish and game have been considered the property of the sovereign. 24 The Agway court, however, concluded that the history
of cases involving the validity of regulatory statutes negated any
idea of fictional ownership in the Commonwealth.
The early cases upheld regulatory statutes by recognizing that
25
the states had a proprietary interest in animals ferae naturae,'
19. See, e.g., Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 S. & R. 71 (Pa. 1826);

Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
20. The relevant portion of the Charter reads:
WEE DOE alsoe give and grant unto the said William Penn,
his heirs and assignes.

. .

all the soyle, lands, fields, woods, under-

woods, mountains, hills, fenns, Isles, Lakes, Rivers, waters, rivuletts, Bays and Inletts, scituate or being within or belonging unto
the Limits and Bounds aforesaid togeather with the fishing of all

sortes of fish, whales, sturgeons and all Royall and other fishes in
the sea, bayes, Inletts, waters or Rivers, within the premises, and
the fish therein taken....

CHARTER OF KING CHARLES II OP ENGLAND TO WILLIAMVr PENN (March 4, 1681)
as found in Ade, Charter of King Charles II of England and William
Penn's Frames of Government for Pennsylvania at 2, DEP'T OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION, COM. OF PA., BULL. No. 506 (1939).
William Penn was deemed

to have an absolute proprietary interest and complete control over his
province. See E. BRONNER, WILLIAM PENN'S "HOLY EXPERIMENT" 23 (1962).
21, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 64, § 1 (1959); see Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475
(Pa. 1810).
22. See R. BROWN, supra note 9, Special Note on Possession at 19-22.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 1-312 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34,

§§ 1311.1-1376.9 (1967).
24. See Commonwealth v. Patsone, 44 Pa. Super. 128 (1910), aff'd per
curiam, 231 Pa. 46, 79 A. 928 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Carson v.

Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810); Commonwealth v. Immel, 33 Pa. Super. 388
(1907); Lehman v. Pennsylvania Game Comm., 34 Pa. D. & C. 662 (C.P.
Dauph. Co. 1939).
25. E.g., Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236, 83 S.W. 955 (1904);
Ex Parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 37 P. 402 (1894); Barrow v. Holland, 125

So.2d 749 (Fla. 1960); Phelps v. Racey, 60 N.Y. 10 (1875); Commonwealth v.
Patsone, 44 Pa. Super. 128 (1910), affd per curiam, 231 Pa. 46, 79 A. 928
(1911), aff'd, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).

See Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing

Rights, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 504, 508-10 (1964); Note, 7 B.U. L. REV. 137
(1927); Note, 38 Gso. L.J. 652 (1950); Note, 6 TENN. L. REV. 141 (1927);
Note, 7 TEXAS L. R.v. 473 (1929).
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so long as this ownership was exercised for the public benefit. 26
When the state ownership argument was urged upon the courts in
other circumstances, however, it was repudiated. For example, in
Missouri v. Holland2 7 state ownership of wild migratory birds was
relied upon in an attempt to thwart the treaty-making power of the
federal government; the United States Supreme Court rejected the
state's argument stating:
To put the claim of the state upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership. The
whole foundation of the state's rights is the presence within
their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived,
tomorrow may be
28 in another state and in a week a thousand miles away.
theory was again clearly repudiated in Toomer v.
The ownership
Witsell,29 where it was advanced to bar non-citizens from sharing
in the state's natural resources (shrimp). The Supreme Court
held that state statutes regulating the taking of wildlife were an
exercise of the police power, not a power based on property rights.
The Agway court could well have distinguished the above
cases and sustained the concept of state ownership in wild animals
and fish in the case before it. The public interest would certainly
be furthered by permitting an action for damages for the destruction of wildlife. The court could also have sustained the action on
the theory that the Commonwealth was entitled to bring suit as
trustee of a valuable natural resource for the benefit of its citizens, 30 thereby protecting one of Pennsylvania's most valuable assets.31
26. Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); see Note, 38 GEo. L.J.
652 (1950).
27. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
28. Id. at 434.
29. 334 U.S. 385 (1948), noted in 38 GEo. L.J. 652 (1950). A concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson,
would have maintained the proprietary interest doctrine, but overturned
the state statute as being in violation of the commerce clause:
A state may care for its own [citizens] in utilizing the bounties
of nature within her borders because it has technical ownership of
such bounties, or, when ownership is in no one, because the state
may for the common good exercise all the authority that technical
ownership ordinarily confers. ...
334 U.S. at 408. See also Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S.
1 (1928), where the Court held that a state statute, requiring that all
shrimp caught in the state be processed there, violated the commerce clause
of the Constitution.
30. The state has been regarded as trustee of wildlife for the benefit
of its people. See Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). Since the
attorney general may enforce and protect a charitable trust, Pruner Estate,
390 Pa. 529, 136 A.2d 107 (1957), because it is for the benefit of the community in general, see 4 A. SCoTT, TRUSTS § 391 (1956), it would seem that
he should be permitted to bring an action to protect the public's interest

in Pennsylvania wildlife.
31.

Sport fishing and hunting has had an unprecedented economic
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Apparently a state may proceed against a polluter by way of
an injunction to abate a public nuisance,3 2 and although there are
no Pennsylvania cases on the subject, the Clean Streams Law provides a procedure for enjoining pollution. 83 An injunction, however, is prospective only and would not repair the damage already
done. Nor are the statutory criminal penalties adequate to deter
pollution or permit replacement of destroyed fish.3 4 Therefore,
it would not seem unrealistic to permit the Commonwealth an action for damages 5 for destruction of
the fish which it preserves
3 6
and propagates for the public benefit.
impact at both the national and state levels. In 1965 thirty-three million
people spent four billion dollars directly on sport fishing and hunting.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RESOURCE PUB. No. 27, 1965 NATIONAL SURVEY
OF FIsHING AND HUNTING (1966). The preservation and enrichment of this

natural resource in Pennsylvania is carried out by the extensive activities
of the Fish and Game Commissions, which have produced dramatic increases in the number and varieties of wild fish and game. See J. DOUBT,
supra note 18; L. LUTTINGER, PENNSYLVANIA BIRD LIFE (Pa. Game Comm.
1966); A. HAZZARD, PENNSYLVANIA FISH (Pa. Fish Comm. 1966). In 1965

Pennsylvania had more paid hunting license holders than any other state
(918,000) and was ranked thirteenth in paid fishing license holders
(476,000). U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.,
chart no. 302 at 211 (1967).
Pollution sources were the major reported cause of death of an estimated 9,115,000 fish in the United States in 1966. Here, too, Pennsylvania
was among the leaders, accounting for 1,493,819 of the fish killed in sixtytwo reported cases. FED. WATER POLL. CONTROL ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, FISH KILLS BY POLLUTION 1966 (1967).
From 1959 to 1965 there
were 853 cases of pollution reported to the Pennsylvania Fish Commission.
Of this number, 304 cases are pending or lack sufficient evidence to be
prosecuted. The remainder resulted in 436 voluntary contributions amounting to $209,181.17 and 113 fines totaling $20,813.63. Interview with Robert
J. Bielo, supra note 3. See note 36 infra.
32. See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897).
33. See PA. STAT. AN. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1966).
34. The Clean Streams Law provides a maximum fine of $100 when
sewage is discharged into a stream, PA. STAT. -ANN. tit. 35, § 691.204 (Supp.
1966), and a maximum fine of $5000 when industrial waste or coal mine
drainage enters a stream, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.309, 691.317 (Supp.
1966). The Fish Law imposes a maximum fine of $1000 for pollution.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 202 (Supp. 1967): The above fines are obviously
not adequate deterrents when they are compared with the cost of installing and maintaining pollution devices., Interview with Robert J. Bielo,
supra note 3.

35. Due to the difficulties of proof it is probable that only the commercial value of the fish actually killed could berecovered because the costs of
restocking the fish and restoring the habitat can only be estimated. Interview with Robert J. Bielo, supra note 3.
36. It is interesting to note that the Fish Commission, either because
of threatened suit or fear of adverse publicity, has settled many cases including several in excess of the maximum fine. The records of the Chief
Warden of the Pennsylvania Fish Commission indicate that in 1966-67
four pollution cases were settled in excess of the $1000 maximum. The
largest settlement, $45,000 with the Glen Alden Coal Co. in 1961, approximated the commercial value of the fish killed. It was estimated that re,
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The Fish Law of 1959 is intended "to prescribe an exclusive
system for the angling, catching and taking of fish, and for their
propagation, management and protection in waters within, bounding on, or adjacent to this Commonwealth .... -"37 In the Agway
case this language was interpreted by the lower court and the concurring opinion in the superior court to mean that the Fish Law
and its penalties were the exclusive remedy for the Commonwealth,
thereby precluding any action for damages.38 An equally reasonable interpretation, however, would be that the legislature intended
the Fish Law to be the exclusive penal remedy, but did not intend
to exclude a civil remedy in addition thereto. The penalties prescribed by the Fish Law have consistently been held to be criminal
rather than civil., 9 Pennsylvania courts have also held that enactment of a statute with a monetary penalty will not preclude an
action for damages when violation of the statute causes an injury
and the statutory penalty is obviously inadequate (as in the pollution setting) to compel adherence to statutory standards.4"
The legislature acknowledged the apparent inadequacy of
present statutory law with the prompt introduction of legislation
intended to provide the remedy denied in the Agway case. 41 Passage of the desired legislation, however, appears to be bogged down
in political quicksand. 42 Until action is taken to correct the result
stocking and restoration of the habitat in that case would exceed one million dollars. Interview with Robert J. Bielo, supra note 3.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 310 (Supp. 1967).
38. See 86 Dauphin at 27; 210 Pa. Super. at 155, 232 A.2d at 71.
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patsone, 44 Pa. Super. 128 (1910), aff'd
per curiam, 231 Pa. 46, 79 A. 928 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Commonwealth v. Immel, 33 Pa. Super. 388 (1907); Commonwealth v. Scott, 76
Pa. D. & C. 115 (Q.S. Sore. Co. 1950).
40. E.g., Westervelt v. Davies, 231 Pa. 548, 80 A. 1054 (1911); Danner
v. Wells, 248 Pa. 105, 93 A. 871 (1905); see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 559
(1952).
41. A new section to the Fish Law of 1959 was proposed:
Section 200.1. Proprietary ownership of Commonwealth.-The
proprietary ownership, jurisdiction over and control of fish living
free in nature including Bait-Fish and Fish-Bait as defined in this
act, are hereby declared to be in the Commonwealth in its sovereign capacity, to be controlled, regulated and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this act, and the Commonwealth
may bring civil actions in trespass to recover the value of such
acquatic life killed in violation of section 200 of this act ...
H.B. No. 513, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (1967).
See PA. LEGIS. JOUR.HousE 907-09 (Reg. Sess. July 17, 1967). The bill passed the House of
Representatives by a unanimous vote, but in the Senate the bill was sent
back to committee where it has apparently died. See HISTORY OF HouSE
BILLS, PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY No. 29 (Reg. Sess. Oct. 23, 1967); PA. LEGIs.
JOUR.-SENATE

384-85 (Reg. Sess. June 20, 1967).

42. See note 41 supra. A Senate bill which would give the Fish
Commission authority as agent of the Commonwealth to bring a suit for
damages when fish are killed by pollution was introduced, but it has seemingly met with a political impasse. S.B. No. 841, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen.
Assembly (1967); see HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY No. 29
(Reg. Sess. Oct. 23, 1967). See also Pittsburgh Press, Aug. 13, 1967, § 4,
at 6, col. 1.
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reached in Agway and to force stringent pollution-preventive measures upon delinquent industries, the menace of pollution remains
to threaten the destruction of fish life in Pennsylvania streams.
Acquiesence in the inertia of the legislature need not be an inevitability, however. It is submitted that sufficient legal bases exist
to permit the courts to extend a civil remedy to the Commonwealth
for the protection of the fish in its waters.
WILLIAM

S.

KIESER

EPILOGUE

After this Issue had gone to press the Pennsylvania General
Assembly amended the Fish Law of 1959 by adding a new section:
Section 202.1 Civil Suits.- (a) The Commonwealth in its
sovereign capacity as the guardian and trustee for the people .

.

. of all the natural resources of Pennsylvania, in-

cluding fish and aquatic life, [has] sufficient interest in
said fish and aquatic animals living in a free state to give
it standing, through its. . . agencies, to recover damages in
civil action against any person

. . .

who unlawfully or neg-

ligently kill[s] or otherwise destroy[s] any fish or other
aquatic animals by pollution.
(b)

The proprietary ownership.

. .

of fish . . . living

free in nature [has] been achieved through the continued
expenditure of Commonwealth funds and efforts to protect,
perpetuate, propagate, and maintain populations of fish...
within the waters of the Commonwealth as a renewable
natural resource. ...
(c)

The Fish Commission .

.

. may, in addition to

criminal penalties provided in this act, bring civil suits in
trespass on behalf of the Commonwealth for the value of
any fish.

. .

destroyed in violation of.

.

. this act.

S.B. No. 841, Second Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (Printer's No.
1564, 1968).

NON PROS-PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE--RULE 1037
Gallagher v..Jewish Hospital Association,425 Pa. 112, 228
A.2d 732 (1967).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently reconsidered
the rules governing the entry of a judgment of non pros in a civil
trial because of the plaintiff's delay of several years in prosecuting
an action. In Gallagher v. Jewish Hospital Association' the court
held that rule 1037 (a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
does not prevent the trial court from granting a non pros to a
defendant even though the defendant did not or no longer could
avail himself of the provisions of that section. The court was of
the opinion that the remedy prescribed by this section was not
exclusive, but merely cumulative and permissive.
Gallagherinvolved two writs of summons, one in trespass and
one in assumpsit, which were served on the defendant on November
16, 1946, for an injury alleged to have occurred to the minor plaintiff on November 12, 1944. Plaintiff took no further action until
August 5, 1965, when a complaint was filed. Defendant filed a
motion on August 25, 1965, for the entry of a judgment of non
pros because of plaintiff's failure to prosecute the action for eighteen years. The trial court sustained the motion as to both actions
and entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, plaintiff's
contention was that rule 1037 (a) "prescribes the exclusive procedure by which a defendant may obtain a judgment of non pros,
where the original action is begun by the issuance of a writ of
summons, ' 2 and that since defendant did not avail himself of this
remedy, a non pros should not have been granted.
Rule 1037(a) states:
If an action is not commenced by a complaint, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a rule
upon the plaintiff to file a complaint. If a complaint is not
filed within twenty (20) days after service of the rule, the
prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a
judgment of non pros.3
The supreme court held that this section is merely permissive and
was not intended to, nor does it, impair or in any way impinge on the power of a court over its judgments. Such
power is the same since the rule was promulgated as it was
before it was adopted. What the rule was designed to do,
and all that it did, was to prescribe definitively the procedure to be followed in order to compel a plaintiff to file
1. 425 Pa. 112, 228 A.2d 732 (1967).
2. Id. at 114, 228 A.2d at 733.
3. PA. R. CIV. P. 1037 (a).
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a complaint or suffer judgment of non pros. for failure to do
SO.4

The court stated further that to preclude a trial court from granting
relief to a defendant who has waited many years for a plaintiff
to file a complaint is against both case law precedent and the wording of the rule itself. As far back as Blackstone's writings, "it has
always been the law that undue delay by a plaintiff after a suit has
been commenced is grounds for the Court to deny recovery by
ordering a non pros of the action." 5 To accept plaintiff's argument,
the court stated, "would exclude and destroy the power of a trial
Court to enter a judgment of non pros, no matter how long plaintiffs delay the filing of a complaint or the prosecution of the action,
and no matter how prejudicial such delay would be."6 This "would
be not only erroneous but unreasonable and ridiculous."'
Furthermore, section (c) of rule 1037 states: "In all cases, the
court on motion of a party, may enter an appropriate judgment
against a party upon default or admission." s The Gallagher court
said in reference to section (c): "It [this rule] gives a blanket
authorization to the court to enter 'appropriate' judgments against
any party upon 'default' or 'admission.' The power under Rule
1037 (c) extends through the whole gamut of legal power."9 This
section, then, permits the trial court to enter a non pros for the
same reasons and under the same circumstances as have been
utilized historically as bases for such a grant.
Another important aspect of the Gallagher decision was the
court's ruling that:
It is no reply to say that the defendant may compel the
plaintiff to declare his cause of action. It is not his duty to
do so, but it is the plaintiff's duty to proceed with his cause
within a reasonable10 time. He is the actor, and must act,
or fail of his action.
Thus, the fact that defendant did not utilize section (a) of rule
1037 was not helpful to the plaintiff in Gallagher. Regardless of
4. 425 Pa. at 116, 228 A.2d at 734, quoting from Glass v. Farmers
Nat'l Bank, 364 Pa. 186, 188, 70 A.2d 356, 358 (1950) (emphasis added).
5. 425 Pa. at 114, 228 A.2d at 733.
6. Id. at 116, 228 A.2d at 734.
7. Id.
8. PA. R. Civ. P. 1037(c).

9. 425 Pa. at 116, 228 A.2d at 735, quoting from 1 GOODiCH-AMRAm,
(Supp. 1962). See also 2A
1037.6 (1960), where it is

STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 1037(c)-1
ANDmRSON, PFNNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE §

stated: "Apart from the authorization of Rule 1037 (a) to enter a judgment
of non pros. for the failure to file a complaint, the court possesses an
inherent discretionary power to enter a non pros. of the plaintiff for
failure to prosecute the action with reasonable diligence, and to bring the
action to trial." (footnotes omitted).
10. 425 Pa. at 115, 228 A.2d at 734, quoting from Potter Title & Trust
Co. v. Frank, 298 Pa. 137, 140, 148 A. 50, 52 (1929).
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the broad authority for this proposition,11 the recent case of Galbraith v. Gahagen12 appears to take an opposite view. It is not
clear, however, whether Galbraith, which did not mention non
pros per se, was intended to govern the situation present in Gallagher.
Galbraith involved a summons in trespass issued on August
22, 1961, for an injury occurring on September 19, 1959. A complaint was served on November 16, 1963, and reinstated on December 21, 1963. Defendant raised a preliminary objection alleging
that the complaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Although not specifically requested by counsel, both the
trial court and superior court discussed non pros, but not in light
of 1037(c). The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, stated
that a defendant's sole remedy when the suit is initiated other than
by a complaint was under section (a) of rule 1037. There was no
discussion of the effect of section (c), but the court said that when
suit is begun by a writ of summons duly served upon the defendant:
He [defendant] cannot complain if the plaintiff takes his
time and files the Complaint more than two years after
service. If any harm is incurred by defendant as a result of
such delay, it results from his own failure to employ the
weapon given him under Rule 1037 to force the plaintiff to
file the Complaint. 13
Possibly this language was not intended to apply when a non
pros is specifically requested under rule 1037(c), as opposed to the
Galbraith situation where the issue was raised by preliminary objection with no reference to that section. Even so, the wording
of the Galbraith decision raises disturbing uncertainties.
Perhaps the non pros issue was not properly raised in the Galbraith
case, thereby making 1037(c) inapplicable since that section states
that the request must be "on motion of a party." Apparently
the court cannot raise the question of a non pros on its own motion.) 4 A reading of section (c), however, discloses that it is not
necessarily limited to motions for a non pros. It specifically pertains to "all cases" and provides for "an appropriate judgment" to
be entered as a result of "default." Could not the court in Gal11. See, e.g., Talbot v. Delaware County Trust Co., 384 Pa. 85, 119 A.2d
518 (1956); Rosenberg v. Silver, 374 Pa. 74, 97 A.2d 92 (1953); Glass v.
Farmers Nat'l Bank, 364 Pa. 186, 70 A.2d 356 (1950); Rocco v. Mook, 8 Pa.
D. & C.2d 359 (C.P. Juniata Co. 1956). For the proposition that the defendant need not be the moving party once the plaintiff has filed a summons
see, e.g., Wildermuth v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 326 Pa. 536, 192 A. 657
(1937); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Frank, 298 Pa. 137, 148 A. 50 (1929);
Prettyman v. Irwin, 273 Pa. 522, 117 A. 195 (1922); Stewart v. Philadelphia,
240 Pa. 569, 88 A. 12 (1913); Waring Brothers v. Pennsylvania R.R., 176
Pa. 172, 35 A. 106 (1896).
12. 415 Pa. 500, 204 A.2d 251 (1964).
13. Id. at 500, 204 A.2d at 251.
14. See 1 GOODRICH-AMRAM,
1037(c)-l (Supp. 1962).

STANDARD

PENNSYLVANIA

PRACTICE

§
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braith have considered the more than two year delay between
summons and complaint a "default"? Was not this question at
least implied in the defendant's preliminary objection, so as to
permit the relief sought to fall properly within 1037 (c)? It is
submitted that the court was in error in not considering section
(c) pertinent to the determination of defendant's preliminary objection.
Frey v. McCardle15 also seemed to hold that the provisions
of rule 1037(a) were exclusive: "The entry of a judgment of non
pros without ruling plaintiff to file a complaint as required by Pa.
R.C.P. 1037(a) is improper."1
Although this case was decided
more on the basis of a lack of prejudice to defendant from plaintiff's delay, the opinion does state that despite a delay of over six
years, a non pros would not be granted under rule 1037 since the
plaintiff did not avail himself of the section (a) procedure before
the complaint was finally filed. Both Galbraith and Frey required
the defendant to be the moving party, and both cases ruled that
section (a) of rule 1037 was the exclusive method by which a defendant could obtain a non pros. Both lines of thought have been
effectively overruled by Gallagher, which it is submitted represents the sounder and more logical view.
Another conflict between the Gallagher and Galbraith decisions is the effect of the statute of limitations on an application for
a judgment of non pros. Although historically it has been held
that the granting of a non pros rests within the discretion of the
trial court 1' and that the statute of limitations is not strictly applicable to motions for non pros,18 the analogy has been drawn and
15. 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 273 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1959).
16. Id. at 276, citing Kibe v. Sentz, 89 Pa. D. & C. 101, 105 (C.P.
Cumb. Co. 1954); Sunbury v. Pennsylvania R.R., 78 Pa. D. & C. 128 (C.P.
Northumb. Co. 1951); Crouse v. Novasecku, 70 Pa. D. & C. 57, 61 (C.P.
Dauph. Co. 1949). These cases involved the procedure to be followed when
appealing from a magistrate's order, discussed in light of rule 1037(a).
For this reason, these cases are not within the scope of the present discussion.
17. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Great A.&P. Tea Co., 394 Pa. 57, 145 A.2d
695 (1958); Alker v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 372 Pa. 327, 93 A.2d 699
(1953); Margolis v. Blecher, 364 Pa. 234, 72 A.2d 127 (1950); Pennsylvania
HR. v. Pittsburgh, 335 Pa. 449, 6 A.2d 907 (1939); Wingert v. Anderson,
309 Pa. 402, 164 A. 333 (1932); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Frank, 298 Pa.
137, 148 A. 50 (1929); Waring Brothers v. Pennsylvania R.R., 176 Pa. 172,
35 A. 106 (1896); Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Clinger, 10 Pa. Super.
92 (1899); Rocco v. Mook, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 359 (C.P. Juniata Co. 1956). It
should be noted that rule 1037(a) somewhat modifies this statement. Section (a) makes the entry of a non pros by the prothonotary a matter of
course once the twenty-day period after service of the rule expires. Even
in this situation, however, it is within the trial court's discretion to nullify
the judgment and consider the case on its merits. Cf. Glass v. Farmers
Nat'l Bank, 364 Pa. 186, 70 A.2d 356 (1950).
18. See, e.g., Alker v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 372 Pa. 327, 93 A.2d 699
(1953); Manson v. First Nat'l Bank, 366 Pa. 293, 77 A.2d 399 (1951);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Pittsburgh, 335 Pa. 449, 6 A.2d 907 (1939); Geyer v.
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there is authority that the analogy is valid. 19 In Gallagher the
court quoted from the leading case of Waring Brothers v. Pennsyl20
vania Railroad,
which stated:
When it is considered that a delay of only six years in the
bringing of such a suit [assumpsit] gives rise to an absolute
bar to its maintenance, at the mere will of the defendant, it
seems useless to consider whether the court, in the exercise
of its discretionary power, may not grant a nonsuit for a
mere wanton
delay of more than 14 years in the prosecution
21
of the suit.
22
The court also quoted Hruska v. Gibson:
The statute of limitations fixes the time as two years from
the happening of an accident to the bringing of suit. It
imposes no hardship on those who institute suit to understand that they must bring this action within two years. It
certainly does not impose a hardship on those bringing the
suit to require them to bring it to trial within a reasonable
time thereafter. If it is against public policy to permit trespass suits to be begun more than two years after the action
arose, it is equally against public policy to permit trespass
suits to be tried more than nine years after they were
started, unless delay is satisfactorily explained. . . . As a
matter of fairness, one who brings another into court should
23
prosecute the claim against him with reasonable diligence.
The logic of this language is clear, yet in Galbraith the court
held that the analogy of the statute of limitations does not apply
at all when suit is commenced by a writ of summons before the
statutory period has run; the service of summons tolls the statute
indefinitely. The court summarized by stating: "We therefore
hold that the defendant having been served with the Summons
should have required plaintiffs to file their Complaint earlier.
Having failed to do so she cannot now complain that the statute of
limitations has barred further action."24 ' In a previous case, 25 the
supreme court held that when a writ of summons was issued, but
not served on the defendant, the statute was tolled for only two
years from the date of issuance. The Galbraith court's distinction
was simply that when the summons was not served, the defendant
was in no position to invoke rule 1037(a) and compel plaintiff to
file his complaint. This concept is linked to the thought, expressed
Walton, 151 Pa. Super. 549, 30 A.2d 643 (1943); Susquehanna Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Clinger, 10 Pa. Super. 92 (1899).
19. See Alker v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 372 Pa. 327, 93 A.2d 699
(1953); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Frank, 298 Pa. 137, 148 A. 50 (1929);
Prettyman v. Irwin, 273 Pa. 522, 117 A. 195 (1922).
20. 176 Pa. 172, 35 A. 106 (1896).
21. Id. at 175, 35 A. at 107.
22. 316 Pa. 518, 175 A. 514 (1934).
23. Id. at 521, 175 A. at 514.
24. 415 Pa. at 502, 204 A.2d at 252.
25. Marucci v. Lippman, 406 Pa. 283, 177 A.2d 616 (1962).
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earlier, that once the writ has been served, the burden of hastening
the action is on the defendant. It is submitted that this is not a
substantial basis for concluding that the statute of limitations is
per se not applicable when the suit was commenced by a writ of
summons duly served upon the defendant.
In another leading case in the non pros setting, Potter Title
& Trust Co. v. Frank,26 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
Laches does not depend upon the statute of limitations,
but on whether due diligence has been shown, and, if not,
whether the delay has been prejudicial to the adverse party.
... Nevertheless, as a general rule, where the plaintiff
suffers a pending suit to remain without action on his part
for over six years, it might, unless there was a compelling
reason therefore,2 be
7 treated as abandoned and a non pros
properly entered.
The Potter case cited an earlier case28 with approval, which stated:
"[A] bandonment will ordinarily be adjudged, by analogy to the
statute [of limitations], if [plaintiff] permits the case to sleep,
without any action being taken, for a longer period than is allowed
for the commencement of the suit."29 Again, it has been stated
that "when neither party makes any move in the suit for a long
time, there is a natural, and should be a legal, presumption that
the dispute has been settled to the satisfaction of both."'
It is evident, therefore, that although the cases do not make
the granting of a non pros depend absolutely upon the time limit
imposed for the bringing of a suit, they have stated repeatedly that
"as a general rule," or "ordinarily," the analogy to the statute of
limitations is valid. It would appear that the Gallagher case again
represents a more accurate application of Pennsylvania law than
does the Galbraith case. For the court in Gallagher to have declared that the period of the statute of limitations would also
govern the maximum permissible lapse between summons and
complaint would have necessitated overruling prior decisional law.
31
the court held that the statute of
In Zarlinsky v. Laudenslager,
limitations did apply where the summons issued but was not served
on the defendant. In that situation, the plaintiff could have the
writ reissued at any time within a period equal to the applicable
statute of limitations.
Taking the Zarlinsky ruling together with one which would
prohibit a plaintiff from filing a complaint in trespass more than
26. 298 Pa. 137, 148 A. 50 (1929).
27. Id. at 141, 148 A. at 52.
28. Prettyman v. Irwin, 273 Pa. 522, 117 A. 195 (1922).
29. 273 Pa. at 526, 117 A. at 196. See Alker v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
372 Pa. 327, 93 A.2d 699 (1953); Weil v. Power B.&.L. Ass'n, 142 Pa. Super.
257, 17 A.2d 634 (1940).
30. Huffman v. Stiger, 1 Pittsb. 185, 187 (C.P. Pa. 1854).
This case was followed in
31. 402 Pa. 290, 167 A.2d 317 (1961).
Marucci v. Lippman, 406 Pa. 283, 177 A.2d 616 (1962).
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two years after a writ of summons was served would produce a
totally unworkable result. A plaintiff could keep his action
alive indefinitely by periodically reinstating the summons, but
never serving it upon the defendant. Once the writ was served,
however, the plaintiff would have but two years further in which
to serve a complaint or suffer a non pros.
To avoid this result, the Gallagher court could have overruled
Galbraith and made the statute of limitations applicable to all
cases in which the suit was commenced by a writ of summons; once
the praecipe is filed, a plaintiff has only the period of the applicable statute in which to bring his complaint. The statute would
come into play twice; once in determining when the suit must be
commenced, and, if commenced by a writ of summons, in determining when the complaint must be filed. Such a ruling would be
simple to effectuate, and would alleviate some of the confusion
concerning the granting of a non pros.
The necessity of a showing of prejudice to the moving party
to sustain a judgment of non pros was not considered by the Gallagher court. This is unusual because historically the granting of
a non pros to a defendant was based primarily upon the plaintiff's
laches, 32 and laches depended upon prejudice. The Gallaghercourt
apparently found the delay of almost nineteen years to be prejudice
per se, in the absence of a sufficient explanation by the plaintiff;
therefore, no discussion of the prejudicial effect of the delay was
necessary. Courts in the past have usually found it necessary to
carefully point out what prejudice had actually occurred before
permitting the non prosY5 It is no great obstacle, however, to
find support for the proposition that a delay as considerable as
that in Gallagher would necessarily be prejudicial to the defendant. In Eilenberger v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad8 4 it was said:

It has always been a policy of the law to expedite litigation and not to encourage long delays. From this fact
arose the various statutes of limitation. The reason why the
law is unfavorable to delayed litigation is self-evident. If
any person has a right which he wishes enforced, he should
enforce it promptly. The person against whom the right is
to be enforced might be greatly prejudiced by plaintiff's
delay. Witnesses disappear or remove to distant parts and
32.

See, e.g., Aldridge v. Great A.&P. Tea Co., 394 Pa. 57, 145 A.2d

695 (1958); Alker v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 372 Pa. 327, 93 A.2d 699
(1953); Manson v. First Nat'l Bank, 366 Pa. 211, 77 A.2d 399 (1951); Margolis v. Blecher, 364 Pa. 234, 72 A.2d 127 (1950); Wildermuth v. Philadelphia
& R. Ry., 326 Pa. 536, 192 A. 657 (1937); Hruska v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 518,
175 A. 514 (1934); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Frank, 298 Pa. 137, 148 A. 50
(1929); Weil v. Power B.&L. Ass'n, 142 Pa. Super. 257, 17 A.2d 634 (1940);
Moore v. Landis, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 786 (C.P. Adams Co. 1964); Frey v.
McCardle, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 273 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1959).
33. See cases cited note 32 supra.
34. 6 Pa. D. & C. 170 (C.P. Lack. Co. 1915).
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the entire aspect of the parties on both sides may change
with the lapse of time.35
In line with this reasoning, the court in Gallagher concluded by
stating:
By filing a writ of summons and then allowing these
actions to lie dormant for 18 years, plaintiffs cannot now be
allowed to breathe life into a claim whose footprints were
extinguished on the sands of time. To hold otherwise
would create injustice, and without any justification very
greatly increase litigation. 0
Possibly, then, a new concept has been introduced into the law
of laches and non pros-that of a lengthy delay being prejudicial
per se. Although the specific time period necessary to produce this
effect was not established, it is submitted that the Gallagher decision is reasonable in this respect.
Under the criteria established in Gallagher, therefore, a non
pros may be granted under section (c) of rule 1037 even though
the provisions of section (a) have not been followed. Although
statutes of limitation are not technically applicable to a delay between service of summons and service of the complaint, any delay
for a period longer than the applicable statute of limitations will
now be scrutinized carefully before a non pros will be refused.
Even if unstated, prejudice to the defendant will probably continue
to be a criterion, as will any other equities in the particular case.
To permit the trial court to exercise its discretion under section
(c) does not destroy the value of section (a), which will serve
to expedite the proceedings in a civil suit and, when a plaintiff
fails to file his complaint within the prescribed twenty days, will
grant the defendant relief from what might have been a spurious
claim. When considered in this light, there is little doubt that
section (a) was ever intended to be the exclusive means of obtaining a non pros.
That the ruling in Gallagher is a correct application of Pennsylvania law cannot be doubted; yet in this instance the price of
accuracy is confusion. Under the Galbraith decision, the determination whether to grant a non pros to a defendant after the
plaintiff delayed in the prosecution of a suit was relatively simple;
unless the defendant had followed the provisions of rule 1037(a),
non pros was unavailable regardless of the length of the delay.
Now, however, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the length of the delay, the defendant may be
granted a non pros under 1037(c) regardless of whether he proceeded under 1037(a). There are no definite guidelines which a
trial court can follow in determining if a non pros is warrantedno prescribed time limit within which a plaintiff must prosecute
35. Id. at 171. See also Hruska v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 518, 175 A. 514

(1934).
36.

425 Pa. at 117, 228 A.2d at 735.
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his action. It is suggested that a more practical rule would result
if the statute of limitations were applied not only to commencement
of the suit, but also to the issuance of a complaint once the suit is
begun by a writ of summons. An alternative would be to consider
a delay for a period longer than the applicable statute of limitations
as prejudicial per se and to grant a non pros upon request of the
defendant unless the delay is satisfactorily explained by the plaintiff. Either approach would be consistent with Gallagher, and
would provide a more workable and definite rule for trial courts
to follow in the future.
JEFFREY C. MUNNELL

TAXATION-REJECTION OF THE "KINTNER"
REGULATIONS
Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
In a significant tax decision the Colorado federal district court
held that a "professional service corporation" of lawyers was entitled to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
Empey v. United States' presented the first judicial examination
of the amended "Kintner" regulations' and held these regulations
invalid and unenforceable. The impact of this decision is that judicial precedent is now established recognizing the validity of professional service corporations within the ambit of the Internal Revenue Code definition of "corporation,"3 thus permitting members of
4
the professions to enjoy various corporate employee benefits.
The tax treatment of professional service organizations began
with Morrissey v. Commissioner.' In this leading Supreme Court
case the succinct definition of the term "corporation" was clarified
for the taxpaying public. Although the revenue statute6 stated
that "the term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies," none of the defining terms were
clearly explained. To ameliorate the situation, the Morrissey
court established several criteria which, if possessed by the entity,
conferred corporate status for tax purposes. These corporate characteristics were later codified in the income tax regulations: associates, an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, continuity of life, centralization of management, liability
for corporate debts limited
to corporate property, and free trans7
ferability of interests.
Armed with a comprehensive test for determining the classification of organizations, the Internal Revenue Service began to tax
as corporations the group medical practices developing in the Mid1. 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
2. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6796, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3).
4. Some of the corporate styled benefits which may be enjoyed by
professional groups are tax sheltered pension and profit sharing plans which
permit larger contributions toward retirement without present tax. Sick
pay plans, group life insurance and a death benefit exclusion are also available for corporate employees. See generally Eber, Pros and Cons of the
New Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. TAXATION 308 (1961); Note,

Professional Corporations: A New Trend?, 43 B.U.L. REv. 107 (1963).

§

5. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
6. Revenue Act of 1924, § 2 (a) (2), 43 Stat. 253; Revenue Act of 1926,
2(a) (2), 44 Stat. 9.
7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 553.
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dle West and the Great Plains area.8 In Pelton v. CommissioneT,9
the initial court case, the Seventh Circuit held that a group of doctors specializing in surgery was taxable as a corporation. The
plaintiff-doctors contended that their medical organization was a
trust and should be taxed as such. To bolster their position of noncorporate status, a local case was cited which held that a corporation could not practice medicine. The court rejected the argument
by quoting the regulations, 1° which provided that organizations can
be "associations" within the meaning of the revenue statute even
though under state law such organizations are technically partnerships. Following this decision a number of clinics reasoned that
if they were to be taxed as corporations, they should take advantage
of the situation and institute retirement and pension plans with the
doctors as the benefited employees. In the landmark case of United
States v. Kintner,"' the taxpayer-doctor and his partner dissolved
their partnership and created an unincorporated association for the
purpose of practicing medicine. The doctors became employees of
the association and therefore qualified for participation in the association's pension plan. In holding that the association should be
deemed a corporation for tax purposes, the court emphasized the
necessity of maintaining a uniform tax law. The opinion stated
that the nature of associations is to be determined by federal tax
law and not state law. Citing Pelton as authority, the court concluded by observing that groups which were prohibited from engaging in certain activities under state law had been recognized as
legitimate corporations for tax purposes. Notably, Kintner was not
appealed to the Supreme Court. Later in Galt v. United States, 12
a decision not even appealed to the court of appeals, doctors forming an association in the face of a state statute prohibiting their
incorporation were held to be validly organized with the requisite
corporate characteristics to qualify for taxation as a corporation.
The Internal Revenue Service predictably non-acquiesced in the
holdings of Kintner and Galt.1 3 This ruling was the initial step in
the chain of events which culminated in Empey. In 1960 the IRS
promulgated income tax regulations now commonly known as the
"Kintner" regulations. 14 These regulations established detailed
tests for determining which organizations would be considered to
8. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 383, 386 (1965). In the 1930's doctors and
other professional men had no pressing desire to attain corporation status
since federal income tax rates were relatively low and the tax sheltered
corporate pensions did not have the attraction they have today. The
government, however, sought to label these group medical practices as
corporations to gain an additional taxable entity.
9. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
10. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 1502-04, T.D. 3748, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 7; Treas.
Reg. 69, Art. 1502-04 (1926).
11. 216 F.2d 418 (9th.Cir. 1954).
12. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
13. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Curm. BULL. 598.
14. T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cmi. BULL. 409.
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have sufficient characteristics to be taxed as corporations. Had
these original regulations gone no further there would have been
no problem, since a professional partnership could merely dissolve
and reform under articles of association. The regulations provided,
however, that although federal law would apply for tax purposes,
the characterization of an organization would be determined by the
applicable state law. The effect of this ruling was to prevent professional groups, operating in most states under the Uniform Partnership Act, Limited Partnership Act or their local equivalent,
from achieving the necessary corporate characteristics. To circumvent the serious limitations imposed by these regulations, many
states enacted professional corporation or association statutes 1 to
15. Since the passage of the "Kintner" regulations thirty-five states

have enacted legislation designed to permit some or all professional groups
to either incorporate or form associations which would possess the necessary corporate characteristics. Alabama Unincorporated Professional Association Act, ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 330-45 (Supp. 1965); Arizona Professional
Corporation Act, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-901-09 (Supp. 1967); Arkansas
Medical and Dental Corporation Acts, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-1701-17,
64-1801-17 (Supp. 1966); Connecticut Professional Associations, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. REV. §§ 621.01-.14 (Supp. 1966); Georgia Professional
Association Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301-18 (Supp. 1966); Idaho Professional Service Corporations, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1301-14 (1967);
Illinois Professional Associations, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 , §§ 101-09
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); Indiana Professional Corporations Act of 1965,
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-5101-11 (Supp. 1967); Kansas Professional Corporations Act, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2701-19 (Supp. 1965); Kentucky
Professional Service Corporations, KY. REV. STAT. § 274 (1963); Louisiana
Professional Corporations Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:901-15 (Supp.
1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 156A, §§ 1-17 (Supp. 1966); Michigan
Professional Service Corporation Act, MIcH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 450.221-.235
(1967); Minnesota Professional Corporations Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
319.01-.41 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 356.010-.200 (1966); The Montana Professional Service Corporation Act, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 152101-16 (Supp. 1967); Nevada Professional Corporation Act, NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 89.010-.110 (1963); New Jersey Professional Corporation Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14:19-1-17 (Supp. 1966); New Mexico Professional Corporation
Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-22-1-13 (Supp. 1967); North Dakota Professional Corporations Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-31-01-14 (Supp. 1967);
Ohio Professional Association Act, OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1785 (Baldwin
Supp. 1966); Oklahoma Professional Corporation Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 801-19 (Supp. 1967); Pennsylvania Professional Association Act,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 12601-19 (1967); Rhode Island Professional Service Corporation Law, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 7-5.1-1 to .1-12 (Supp.
1966); South Carolina Professional Association Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 561601-17 (Supp. 1966); South Dakota Medical Corporation Act, S.D. LAws
ch. 29, § 1-18 (1961); Tennessee Uniform Partnership Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 61-105 (Supp. 1966); Texas Uniform Partnership Act, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. art. 6132b, § 6(3) (Supp. 1966); Utah Professional Corporation
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-1-15 (Supp. 1967); Vermont Incorporation
of Professional Persons, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 901-13 (Supp. 1967); The
Professional Associations Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-873-98 (1967); West
Virginia Dental Corporations, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-4a-12 (Supp.
1967); Wisconsin Service Corporation Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.99 (Supp.
1967); The Supreme Court of Colorado adopted a rule permitting lawyers
to practice in corporate form. COLO. Sup. CT. R. 265.
r
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enable members of the professions to meet the IRS requirements
and obtain the various corporate tax advantages. To counter the
effect of this legislation, the Service notified the public of its intent
to issue amendments to the "Kintner" regulations." These amendments would declare the tax status of the new professional service
corporations, which had not been contemplated by the original
regulations. In the interim, the court in Foreman v. United
States17 held that a group of surgeons operating a clinic under
articles of association should be treated as a corporation, not a
partnership, notwithstanding the fact that doctors could not form
a corporation under local law. The proposed regulations were
issued in 1963 and finally adopted in 1965.18 The amended version
eliminated the example included in the 1960 edition which had
permitted "association" status for a medical group with characteristics similar to the Kintner organization except for a modified
form of transferability of interests of the members. 19 The amendment also provided that a "professional service organization" must
meet the Morrissey criteria2 0 to be treated as a corporation, regardless of local label.21 The effect of this amendment was to make it
virtually impossible for a professional service group to qualify for
corporate tax advantages.
Capsulized, the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of the
method of tax classification of professional service organizations
had come almost full circle. Initially, corporate or association
status was determined by mechanical application of the federal
standards promulgated in Morrissey. This view was altered by the
"Kintner" regulations under which local standards determined
classification. A return to federal criteria was accomplished by
the amended regulations of 1965. This return, however, was
modified to the extent that:
[A] lthough it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local law which establishes the tests or standards which will
be applied in determining the classification in which an
organization belongs, local law governs in determining
whether the legal relationships which have been established
in the formation
of an organization are such that the stand22
ards are met.

16. T.I.R. No. 471, Announcement 63-57, 1963 INT. REv. BULL. 21 at 42.
17. 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6795, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553.
19. The amended regulations of 1965 omitted the first example in
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1960).
20. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), T.D. 6795, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553
states the rule: "[T]hus a professional service corporation formed under
the law of a state authorizing the formation by one or more persons of a
so-called professional service corporation, would not be classified for purposes of taxation as a 'corporation' merely because the organization was
so labeled under local law."
22. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
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In a situation where case law approved corporate tax standing
for professional organizations and Treasury regulations were to
the contrary, litigation was inevitable. A direct confrontation between taxpayer and tax collector, however, was delayed and discouraged by the grant of an amnesty by the Service.23 The grant
provided that the special regulations applicable to professional organizations, although effective December 31, 1960, would be waived
until December 31, 1964, if such organizations had been formed
under local law or regulatory rule specifically authorizing their
formation and tax classification as corporations. This device provided incentive for many professional groups to return to partnership status and therefore avoid conflict with the Service.
The vacilating interpretations of what organizations should
be taxed as corporations set the stage for the Empey case. The
plaintiff brought a civil action for refund of federal income tax
paid for the calendar year 1965. The plaintiff-attorney was an
employee of a professional service corporation engaged in the practice of law which was incorporated under the authority of Colorado
Supreme Court Rule 265.24

The right to a refund hinged on the

tax classification of the firm. If it were designated a corporation
the plaintiff was entitled to recover; if a partnership the claim
would fail. Defending the position that the corporation should be
taxed as a partnership, the IRS argued that a corporation could
not provide the personal relationship required between a lawyer
and his client and that the regulations 25 required a professional
corporation to be taxed as a partnership unless its corporate characteristics were clearly such that it resembled a corporation rather
than a partnership. The court rejected the government's argument.
After analyzing the language of the Code definition of "partnership, '26 the court concluded that the term referred only to unincorporated organizations. By this interpretation incorporated organizations are necessarily excluded from the classification of partnerships. Since the plaintiff's "professional corporation" was incorporated, it could not be a partnership. The court buttressed its
opinion by citing Pelton, Kintner, and Galt and noting the absence
of any decisional law or congressional intent favoring the government's position of requiring taxation of professional organizations
"Kintner"
as partnerships. The court concluded by holding the
27
regulations invalid and awarding the plaintiff a refund.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Rev. Proc. 65-27, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 1017.
COLO. SUP. CT. R.265.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(h) (1965).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a) (2) provides:

(2) Partnership and Partner-The term "partnership" includes a

syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business, financial
operation or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the
meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the
term "partner" includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or organization.
27. The court also stated that even if it were assumed that the regu-
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The Empey case is an important step in reaching equitable
treatment of members of the professions. Under this court's ruling, a state law which confers corporatestatus, as opposed to mere
association status, on a professional organization provides the
mechanism whereby these groups can avail themselves of increased
health and deferred benefit plans. It is submitted, however, that
the adjudicative path is a poor alternative to the more satisfactory
method of direct legislation. At one time it was hoped that the
enactment of state professional service corporation and association
statutes would stir Congress to enact corrective legislation as it previously did with community property laws.2 This has not occurred
and now it seems that one state by its particular statutes can obtain
for its professional groups tax advantages not available in another
state without the same technical legislation. A renewed hope is
expressed that Congress will heed the call and give all professional organizations the tax benefits enjoyed by their commercial
brothers.
DAvID C. JONES

lations were valid, the plaintiff's professional corporation did more nearly

resemble a corporation than a partnership; therefore, the plaintiff would
still be entitled to a refund. 272 F. Supp. at 854.
28. Not long ago a tax inequity existed, similar to that imposed on professional organizations, whereby fortunate residents of "community property" states had many federal income, estate and gift tax advantages arising from the split ownership between spouses based on state law. As in
the professional organization situation, some states which were impatient
with the failure of Congress to eliminate the discrimination changed their
state law to achieve the same preferential tax treatment as in community property states. Moved by the initiative of these states, Congress
enacted measures which removed the state-created advantages of the
community property law and the inequity was eliminated. See Bittker,
Professional Associations and Federal Income Tax: Some Questions and
Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961).

